

# SIMPLIFIED REPORT FOR LESS SERIOUS CASUALTY BY THE RO-RO MORNING POST

Drifting from quay in the Port of Koper



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REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
MINISTRSTVO ZA INFRASTRUKTURO

SLUŽBA ZA PREISKOVANJE LETALSKIH,  
POMORSKIH IN ŽELEZNIŠKIH NESREČ IN  
INCIDENTOV

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# **SIMPLIFIED REPORT FOR LESS SERIOUS CASUALTY BY THE RO-RO MORNING POST**

**26. 07. 2023**

**Drifting from quay in the Port of Koper**

Izola, 20. 01. 2024

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Extract from the Maritime Code of the Republic of Slovenia (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 62/16 - Official Consolidated Text, 41/17, 21/18 - ZNOrg, 31/18 - ZPVZRZECEP, 18/21, 21/21 - Amended and 76/23)

## Chapter XI - INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS

### Article 200a

The purpose of investigation of maritime accidents under this Act is not to establish the responsibility or fault, but to determine the causes of accidents and to prevent similar accidents.

### Article 200e

Data obtained by an investigator during the investigation of a maritime accident shall be confidential and not publicly available. These data may be publicly available only if there is prevailing public interest arising from the investigator's final report on a maritime accident.

### Article 200g

The investigation of a maritime accident shall be independent from investigations of criminal acts or other parallel investigations the object of which is the identification of responsibility and determination of fault. These investigations shall not unduly inhibit, interrupt, or defer the investigation of maritime accidents.

#### Information:



The Marine Accident and Incident Investigation Reports are published on the website of the Ministry of Infrastructure at the following address:

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All times mentioned in this report are local (UTC+2h) unless otherwise stated.

The provisions of the international conventions referred to in this report must be interpreted and understood in the light of the full text of those conventions, including any annexes.

This report is published in identical Slovenian and English versions. In case of any disputes or disagreements, the Slovenian version of this report shall apply.

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# ANNEXES

## MEANING OF TERMS

<b>Concept / Abbr</b>	<b>Description</b>
AIS	- Automatic Identification System
ARSO	- Slovenian Environment Agency
BA	- British Admiralty
CNP	- Traffic Control Centre (SMA)
COG	- Course Over Ground
GT	- Gross tonnage
kt, kts	- Knot, knots
kW	- Kilowatt / Kilowatt
LOA	- Length Over All
LPP	- Length Between Perpendiculars
EN	- Local time
m	- Meter
M	- Nautical mile
MBL	- Minimum Breaking Load
MMSI	- Maritime mobile service identity
NAVTEX	- Narrow-band direct-printing telegraph equipment for receiving meteorological or navigational information
OOW	- Officer Of Watch
ROT	- Rate of Turn
SMA	- Slovenian Maritime Administration
SOG	- Speed Over Ground
SOLAS	- International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
T	- Tone (metric tons)
TEU	- 20-foot equivalent unit
TRT	- Port of Koper Bulk cargo terminal
UKC	- Under Keel Clearance
UTC	- Universal Time Co-ordinated
VHF	- Very High Frequency (Radio)
VNT	- Port of Koper Multi-purpose terminal
VTS	- Vessel Traffic Services





Figure 1: RO-RO MORNING POST, (Vessel Finder.com)

## SUMMARY

On 22/07/2023 at 19:19 LT, the RO-RO vessel MORNING POST arrived from the port of Piraeus in the area on the Port of Koper anchorage and anchored at position B3 at 19:41.

On 25.07.2023 at 15:14 the pilot boarded the vessel and at 16:17 she was berthed at berth RO4 in Basin III and commenced commercial operations for the transshipment of motor vehicles. The vessel completed commercial operations at approximately 16:45 the following day and requested the pilot for departure. At 16:33 the vessel was informed that departure is postponed at this time due to an approaching storm and strong winds.

At 16:40 a strong wind was blowing from NNE at 19,0 m/s. Between 16:52 and 17:10 the wind gusts caused the bow mooring winches to fail and one of the bow lines to snap. One of the springs on the stern snapped as well and the stern also started to move away from the pier. The vehicle embarkation/debarkation access ramp remained lowered on the shore. The ship used the bow thruster, which was operating at full power towards the berth. During this time the tug Wotan arrived and pushed the ship towards the berth. At 17:06 the ship was again tied up to the quay.

As the vessel was approaching the berth again, the loading/unloading RO-RO vehicle deck ramp which had been lowered on the access quay came in contact with the customs security fence on the quay, damaging it in length of approximately ten meters. Other than the above-mentioned minimal damage to the port infrastructure, two broken ropes and slight damage to the ramp flap, there was no other material damage in the incident. No persons were injured in the incident.

The ship left the berth on 26.07.2023 at 20:36.

From the analysis of the incident, it was found that the ship had an automatic constant tension facility activated at the berth, which caused the ropes to slacken in strong winds. As a result, one safety recommendation was issued.

# CHAPTER 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION

## 1.1. SHIP'S PARTICULARS

<b>SHIP'S PARTICULARS</b>	
Name of ship	MORNING POST
Type of ship	RO-RO
Owner	Wilhemsen Ship Management Ltd.,
Operator	Wilhemsen Ship Management Ltd.,
Year of construction	2014, Gunsan, Korea
Classification Society	KRS Korean Register of Shipping
Flag	Marshal Islands
Port of entry	Majuro
IMO number	9669029
MMSI number	538005452
Call sign	V7EA8
Length	199,97
Width	35,40
Maximum draft	10,50
Maximum height	65.276
Gross tonnage (GT)	25.639
Net tonnage (NT)	
Displacement (D)	22.674
Engine	
Engine power	15.200 kW
Thrusters	BT x 1
Propellers	
<b>VOYAGE INFORMATION</b>	
Previous port	Piraeus
Port of destination	Koper
Voyage type	International
Cargo	Vehicles
No. of Crew	23
<b>CASUALTY OR INCIDENT INFORMATION</b>	
Date and Time	26 07. 2023 at 16:52 LT
Type of accident or incident	Less serious casualty
Location of the event	Port of Koper, berth RO4
Part of the ship	-/-
Human injuries / casualties	-/-
Ship's operations	In port, alongside

Travel segment	In port, awaiting departure
Weather and weather effects	Stormy weather
Draft at the time of the accident	8,10 / 8,10

In accordance with the provisions of Article 2(2)(1) of the Regulation on the investigation of marine casualties (Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia No 67/11), a marine casualty is any occurrence on board or in connection with a ship where:

- a person dies or suffers serious injury in connection with the operation of the ship:
- a person falls from the ship due to the operation of the ship,
- the ship is lost, presumed lost or abandoned,
- **the ship is damaged,**
- the boat runs aground, unless she runs aground for a short period of time on purpose and is not damaged as a result,
- the ship is unseaworthy,
- the ship collides,
- **property damage caused by the operation of the ship,** or
- the environment is polluted as a result of damage to the ship or the operation of the ship.

## 1.2. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Due to the incoming bad weather or strong winds ("Tramotana"), the Slovenian Maritime Administration (SMA) has issued on VHF Channel 08 a general warning to all ships in the cargo port of Koper at 1600 on 26 July 2023.

At 16:24, SMA informs the pilots that the MORNING POST is cleared for departure. The ship is moored at berth RO4, in Basin III of the Port of Koper (Figure 2).




Figure 2: RO-RO MORNING POST at berth RO4, Basin III at Port of Koper (Marine Traffic)

At 16:33 MORNING POST contacted SMA and asked for the pilot. The duty officer at the Traffic Control Centre at SMA informed the vessel that the pilot will not be arriving and that the ship will not be unberthing of the vessel until further notice due to the expected strong winds from the NNE direction. At the same time, he warned and instructed the vessel's officer that it is necessary for vessel to reinforce the mooring as the ship is berthed on one of the most wind-exposed locations.

At 16:39 MORNING POST called SMA and asked again about the arrival time of the pilot, as apparently, he had not understood previously given information. The duty officer reiterates that there will be no pilot for the time being and that the vessel needs to strengthen the mooring. This time the ship repeats the information and received warning.

Meanwhile, at 16:40:49, MSC Belle at Berth 7A in Basin I, due to the already unfavorable weather conditions (Tramontane intensity 19.0 m/s, gust 23.9 m/s), requests the SMA for tug's assistance, which started pushing MSC Belle at 16:47 as a precautionary measure. The tug Wotan was present in Basin II, at PT1 liquid cargo berth as the precautionary assistance of the tanker STI Fulham. At the same time, between 16:45 and 18:25, three tugs were active in the maneuver to re-berth the vessel Xin Beijing safter she experienced breakaway from berth at Basin I.

At 16:51, due to strong winds gusting 25 m/s, the headlines from of the MORNING POST started to slacken. The bow of the vessel continued to move away from the pier.

At 16:55, the vessel's bow was already about 30 meters from off the pier (Figure 3). At this point, one of the headlines broke.



Figure 3: RO-RO MORNING POST, Bow drifting off the pier (VNC)

At 16:55 MORNING POST called the SMA and requested tug's assistance.

At 16:55:55 due to combined drifting of bow and stern off the pier, one of the aft springs (forward position) parted (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Breaking of the aft spring (VNC)

At 17:00, following the instructions from duty officer at SMA, the tug Wotan interrupted the precautionary assistance of the tanker STI Fulham at berth PT1 in Basin II and proceeded from Basin II to Basin III to assist the MORNING POST. Duty SMA officer advised the vessel to drop anchor to prevent

further drift. The ship did not follow the advice given. While she was drifting off the pier, vessel kept using the bow thruster with all power to starboard, trying to stop drifting further away from the pier.

At approximately 17:01, the bow of the MORNING POST stopped drifting at approximately 60 meters from the pier and the stern moved away approximately 15 meters (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Display of vessel’s drifting from the pier (Marine Traffic)

During the vessel’s drift, the loading/unloading RO-RO vehicle deck ramp remained on the approach quay. According to the Master himself, this was ordered by him in order to mitigate as much as possible the ship’s stern drifting away from the berth (?!).

At approximately 17:06, the ship was again backed up against the quay. In the process, the loading/unloading RO-RO vehicle deck ramp was sliding on the access pier, damaging the pier security and customs fence rail and the ramp’s rightmost flap (Figure 6).

At 17:10 the tug Wotan arrived under the ship’s side and commenced assisting by pushing amidships to the starboard, thus keeping the ship alongside the quay.

At 17:42 the tug Wotan is replaced by the tug Neptune, which remained alongside the ship until its departure at 20:36.

### 1.3. IMPLICATIONS

#### 1.3.1. Damage on board Morning Post

- Due to strong winds, while drifting off the pier, two headlines were damaged (broken) on the bow and one aft spring broken at the stern.
- Damaged loading/unloading RO-RO vehicle deck ramp flap.

### 1.3.2. Damage on port infrastructure

- Supporting posts for customs security fence and a panel fence approximately 10 meters long.



Figure 6: Damaged ramp flap and security fence (VNC)

## 1.4. THE PORT OF KOPER AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE BERTH

Review of moorings and mooring devices, fenders, and depths.

### 1.4.1. Review of bollards and mooring devices

The berthing facilities at the terminal are: one 150 tons capacity mooring device, three moorinpoints each with three hooks with a total capacity of 150 tons, five bollards on the mooring dolphins (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and the shore bollards (6A, 7, 7A, 8 and 9), all with a capacity of 100 tons. The geometry and the capacity of the moorings ensure the security of the berth.




Figure 7: Arrangement and load capacity of mooring points (PM) and mooring facilities (PN), (Luka Koper)





Figure 8: Mooring Hooks (PM), Bollards on mooring dolphins (1-5) and Shore bollards (6-9)

#### 1.4.2. Suitability of fenders overview

On each mooring dolphin there is one fender with characteristics of  $E=480 \text{ kNm}$  and  $R= 1020 \text{ kN}$ ,<sup>1</sup> which corresponds perfectly to the characteristics of RO-RO vessels and their safe berthing.



Figure 9: Fenders on mooring dolphins and fenders on access pier

#### 1.4.3. Hydrographic review of Basin III

Mooring depths are in accordance with the project plan.




Figure 10: Depths at berth RO4 (Luka Koper)

<sup>1</sup> "E" - Normal energy of attachment absorbed by the fender (kNm), "R" - Reaction force generated by the fender

Figure 10 shows the latest bathymetric measurements along the mooring site; depths along the entire longitudinal profile hydrographically ( $h=-70\text{cm}$ ) exceed the 10 m limit.

## 1.5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

### 1.5.1. General meteorological conditions in the Koper harbor area - overview

A good understanding and knowledge of meteorological and oceanographic conditions is fundamental to ensuring maritime safety. The area of the Gulf of Trieste is exposed to weather conditions that can roughen the sea and endanger the safety of vessels. The most common wind is a north-easterly wind, also known as a Bora. This gusty and gusty wind causes waves to form in irregular shapes, up to 3 m high. The waves in a storm are short, narrow, and steep, breaking in a picturesque manner and producing a spray of water droplets on the surface of the water. The storm pushes the surface water away from the shore and the sea level then drops. On average, more than a third of all winds blow from this direction each year. Storms are particularly frequent from November to March.

In addition to the winds, there are also southeasterlies and southerlies, which blow evenly throughout the year. Waves are more regular in shape, up to 4 m or more high. Moderate southerly winds raise the water level up to 25 cm, and up to 0.5 m in autumn and winter. However, from October to December, when the weather is accompanied by a strong south-easterly wind, the tide tends to push the sea masses towards the Slovenian and northern Italian coasts. This can cause flooding and raise sea levels by more than 85 cm above mean sea level.

On the waterway and in the port itself, wind is the most prominent attribute of navigational risk. On the waterway and in the harbor, the most prominent attribute of navigational risk is wind. Summer storms are particularly dangerous, as they can catch ships just as they are docking.

Admiralty Sailing Directions NP47 - Mediterranean Pilot Vol. 3 (Ed. 17, 2020) under the subheading 'local weather' and chapter 10.129, states: *"Tramontana (10.101) has a strong northerly wind blowing into the harbor. It is most common in winter and strong gusts, usually associated with storms, can cause damage to vessels." Tramontane is specifically mentioned in paragraph 10.101: "Tramontane winds are strong but short-lived NW to NNW winds that are locally present in the Gulf of Koper. It can occur at any time of the year but is most likely to occur in summer or early autumn. It is associated with the passage of cold fronts over the Alps and may be accompanied by storm activity in the direction of a north-westerly storm line heading towards Trieste and the Gulf of Koper. Winds are considered dangerous due to their sudden and frequent occurrence. Typical wind speeds are between 40 and 60 knots. Winds are of a transient nature, usually lasting between 1 and 3 hours in the Gulf of Koper, often quickly becoming gale force."*

Measurements have been carried out at the "Štapiči" site to the right of the entrance to Basin I since 2014, at the container terminal site since 2015, at the VNT terminal site since 2016 and at the site in front of Pier II since 2018. Measurements are carried out with modern high temporal resolution meters, allowing up to 20 Hz at VNT and CT. The anemometer at the container terminal (Basin I) and the anemometer at the VNT (Basin III) are identical 3D anemometers capturing data at 20 Hz.

Figures 11 and 12 show the wind direction and speed, and the wind gust direction and speed from the measuring stations at the container terminal of the Port of Koper, Cape Madona, Cape Debele Rtič and the VNT terminal, which is in the immediate vicinity of the Ro4 terminal. The winds are converted to a height of 10 m in UTC notation. The graphs show the values in the time window of the event that occurred on 26 July 2023 between 14:20 and 15:20 UTC.

Winds averaged 7-17 m/s with maximum gusts up to 22.23 m/s from the north (tramontane), daylight visibility was good. Measured wind speeds ranged from 4 to 7 Beauforts (Bf) on the Beaufort scale, while maximum wind gusts were measured up to 9 Bf.

The yellow highlighted banner shows the time window of wind strength when the wind reaches 20 m/s at Madona and later at the VNT terminal, the storm at Madona is detected as much as 20 minutes earlier.



Figure 11: Wind speed overview data; top: Madona, DB and CT; bottom: VNT (SMA)




Figure 12: Overview of wind directions; top: Madona, DB and CT; bottom: VNT (SMA)

### 1.5.2. Weather conditions before and during the Morning Post incident

A few days before the accident, an unstable weather situation had developed. Between 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> July, the center of a cyclone with a cold front passed over the North Sea and Scandinavia, passing through central Europe. A valley of high altitude extended south across western Europe to the northern part of Spain, moving slowly eastwards. The axis of this high-level valley crossed Slovenia on the evening of Wednesday 26 July. South-westerly air currents prevailed over the Alps during this period, bringing moist and unstable air. Storm systems formed over the northern part of the Po Plain and occasionally affected the weather in Slovenia. The Xin Beijing was berthed at Berth 7c in Basin I of the Port of Koper on 26 July 2023.

In view of the current weather situation and the forecasts of meteorological models, the National Meteorological Service has issued several warnings of storms and high heat load. In addition, the ship was in range of two NAVTEX stations (Slit and Mondolfo) which also forecast storms. Trieste Radio also broadcast a SECURITE message before the storm. The storm could already be visually observed one hour before the arrival of the storm. The radar reflectivity of the precipitation is shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13: Radar image of precipitation 26<sup>th</sup> July (ARSO)

The strongest wind gusts were recorded between 16:20 and 17:20 on 26<sup>th</sup> July 2023 at the Koper Kapitanija gauging station (24.5 m/s). Figure 14 shows the time course of the average wind speed (green) and its strongest gusts (yellow) from 24 to 26 July at the Koper Kapitanija gauging station. At 16:00, the duty officer at the CNP issued a general warning on VHF channel 08 to all ships in the cargo port of Koper about the possibility of severe weather and strong winds ("Tramontane").




Figure 14: Time course of the average wind speed and its strongest gusts (ARSO)

### 1.5.3. NAVTEX messages

At least three messages were received on 26.7.2023. The stations in range that issued weather warnings are Split ('Q') and Mondolfo ('U').

2023-07-26 05:40:17(LV) AREA: Q

ZCZC QE16

260240 UTC JUL 23

SPLIT RADIO

WEATHER BULLETIN FOR ADRIATIC ISSUED BY THE MARINE METEOROLOGICAL CENTER  
SPLIT ON 26/07/2023 AT 0000 UTC

WARNING:

ON CENTRAL/\_ERN ADRIATIC LOC GUSTS OF SW/NW WIND, IN THE MORNING ON N-ERN  
ADRIATIC NE 35-45 KT, IN VELEBIT STRAIT

TO 55 KT.ON CENTRAL/S-ERN ADRIATIC ISOLATED SUDDEN STORMS.

FORECAST FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS VALID UNTIL 27/07/2023 AT 0000 UT\_

N-ERN ADRIATIC:

NE/NW WIND 6-16 KT, TILL THE MORNING INCR ON 10-20 KT, IN VELEBIT STRAI\_ TO  
28 ((5=, OVERDAY GRADUALLY DECR B53\_(3()93\_.94,8,\_ 9!!'\_943 '-EII\_FM  
CSERA\_TEMP4.

VIS BQPAWP KM. VRB C\_OUDY J\_TH\_RAIN/T-SHWRS LOC, AFTERNOON BECOMING  
CLEARING UP.

261040 UTC JUL 23

SPLIT RADIO

WEATHER BULLETIN FOR ADRIATIC ISSUED BY THE MARINE METEOROLOGICAL CENTER SP  
LIT ON 26/07/2023 AT 1000 UTC

WARNING:

ISOLATED GUSTS OF NE/NW WIND 35-45 KT,TODAY IN VELEBITSKI KANAL UP TO 55 KT  
.TILL THE END OF THE DAY LOC POSS SUDDEN STORMS,ON S-ERN ADRIATIC AND OVERN  
IGHT.

SYNOPSIS:

TROUGH WITH COLD FRONT SHIFTING ACROSS ADRIATIC TO THE EAST, THEN RIDGE OF  
HIGH SLOWLY INCR FM THE WEST.

FORECAST FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS VALID UNTIL 27/07/2023 AT 1000 UTC

N-ERN ADRIATIC:

NE/NW WIND 12-22,IN VELEBITSKI KANAL NE UP TO 28 KT,OVERNIGHT DECR TO 6-16,  
IN VELEBITSKI KANAL UP TO 20 KT.

SEA 3,LOC 4,FM THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT 2-3.

VIS MORE THAN 20 KM.

VRB CLOUDY,LOC RAIN OR T-SHWRS,OVERNIGHT CLEARING UP.

261440 UTC JUL 23

SPLIT RADIO

WEATHER BULLETIN FOR ADRIATIC ISSUED BY THE MARINE METEOROLOGICAL CENTER SP  
LIT ON 26/07/2023 AT 1000 UTC

WARNING:

ISOLATED GUSTS OF NE/NW WIND 35-45 KT,TODAY IN VELEBITSKI KANAL UP TO 55 KT  
.TILL THE END OF THE DAY LOC POSS SUDDEN STORMS,ON S-ERN ADRIATIC AND OVERN  
IGHT.

SYNOPSIS:

TROUGH WITH COLD FRONT SHIFTING ACROSS ADRIATIC TO THE EAST, THEN RIDGE OF  
HIGH SLOWLY INCR FM THE WEST.

FORECAST FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS VALID UNTIL 27/07/2023 AT 1000 UTC

## CHAPTER 2 – ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS

From the analysis of the event presented, it can be concluded that:

- The storm system and the possibility of a storm with strong winds was well forecast. The Morning Post was able to monitor the weather situation and was also informed of the possibility of windstorm by the agents, and CNP duty officer, who issued a general warning on VHF channel 08 to all ships in the cargo port of Koper about the possibility of severe weather and high winds ("Tramontane"). The ship was in range of two NAVTEX stations (Split and Mondolfo), both of which gave the appropriate warning; Trieste radio transmitted a SECURITE message on VHF16 before the storm.
- Apparently, the Morning Post was surprised by the strength of the storm, underestimating the strength of the development and the strength of Tramontana.
- The ship was moored with four headlines and two springs at the bow and four stern lines and two springs at the stern. The CNP duty officer informed the ship that the mooring had to be reinforced due to the incoming bad weather. The ship did not comply with good seamanship, which may be since the ship was ready to depart and would have departed at 17:00 according to the scheduled pilotage plan.
- At a wind speed of 19.0 m/s gusting to 23.9 m/s, the forward and stern lines began to slacken and simultaneously unwind from the drum of the mooring winches. Two ropes snapped in the process.
- Commercial transshipment operations had already been completed. The response of all the services and authorities (CNP Duty Supervisors, Adria-Tow tugs, linesmen) involved in dealing with the situation of other ships in port or the maritime incident of the Morning Post was coordinated and efficient.

# CHAPTER 3 – CONCLUSIONS

## 1. Releasing of ropes on mooring winches

Figure 15 shows that the ship was using the constant tension facility. The vessel started to move away from the quay at a wind's load caused by wind speed of 19.0 m/s, gusting from 23.9 m/s and a force of 9 Bf, due to the operation of the constant tension facility and automatic slackening of the ropes on all mooring winches. Surveillance camera footage shows that on several occasions the ropes automatically slackened as the mooring was moving away from the shore. Two of the ropes snapped. **Safety Recommendation 1.1 follows from point 1.**




Figure 15: Automatic slackening of the ropes at 16:54:24, 16:54:32, 16:54:35 (VNC)



## CHAPTER 4 – SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

A safety recommendation is a proposal made by an investigating body, based on information obtained from an investigation, with the aim of preventing accidents or incidents.

Preliminary safety recommendations<sup>2</sup> on weather monitoring and mooring reinforcement were issued on 1.8.2023 due to the serious maritime casualty of the Maersk Houston (EMCIP 2023/004699) and the maritime incident of the Xin Beijing EMCIP 2023/004707).

### **1. Wilhemsen Ship Management Ltd.**

1.1. It is recommended that in the event of expected bad weather, mooring lines on winches should be secured with brakes and that the constant tension facility should not be used. If the Safety & Quality Manual does not mention such procedures, it is recommended that it shall be updated.

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<sup>2</sup> Where the safety issue identified is of such a serious nature that it needs to be urgently addressed, a provisional preliminary safety recommendation is issued, even though the investigation is still ongoing, and the report has not yet been prepared.